Abstract-With the rapid development of cloud services, the techniques for securely outsourcing the prohibitively expensive computations to untrusted servers are getting more and more attention in the scientific community. Exponentiations modulo a large prime have been considered the most expensive operations in discrete-logarithm-based cryptographic protocols, and they may be burdensome for the resource-limited devices such as RFID tags or smartcards. Therefore, it is important to present an efficient method to securely outsource such operations to (untrusted) cloud servers. In this paper, we propose a new secure outsourcing algorithm for (variable-exponent, variable-base) exponentiation modulo a prime in the two untrusted program model. Compared with the state-of-the-art algorithm, the proposed algorithm is superior in both efficiency and checkability. Based on this algorithm, we show how to achieve outsource-secure Cramer-Shoup encryptions and Schnorr signatures. We then propose the first efficient outsource-secure algorithm for simultaneous modular exponentiations. Finally, we provide the experimental evaluation that demonstrates the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed outsourcing algorithms and schemes.
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INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing, the long-standing vision of computing as a utility, enables convenient and on-demand network access to a centralized pool of configurable computing resources. One of the most attractive benefits of this new computing environment is the so-called outsourcing paradigm, where the resource-constrained devices can outsource their computation workloads to cloud servers and enjoy the unlimited computation resources in a pay-per-use manner. As a result, the enterprises can avoid large capital outlays in hardware/software deployment and maintenance.
Despite the tremendous benefits, the outsourcing paradigm inevitably introduces some new security concerns and challenges [45] , [50] . First, the cloud servers can only be assumed to be semi-trusted, while the computation tasks often contain some sensitive information that should not be exposed to the cloud servers. As such, the first security challenge is the secrecy of the outsourcing computation: the cloud servers should not learn anything about what it is actually computing (including the secret inputs and the outputs). We argue that the encryption can only provide a partial solution to this problem since it is very difficult to perform meaningful computations over the encrypted data. Note that fully homomorphic encryption could be a potential solution, but the existing schemes are not practical yet. Second, the semi-trusted cloud servers may return invalid results. For example, the servers might contain a software bug that will fail on a constant number of invocations. Moreover, the servers might decrease the amount of the computations due to financial incentives and then return computationally indistinguishable (invalid) results. Therefore, the second security challenge is the checkability of the outsourcing computation: the client should have the ability to detect any failures if the cloud servers misbehave. Obviously, the test procedure should never require some other complicated computations, otherwise the outourcing will become meaningless. It must be far more efficient than accomplishing the computation task itself.
The problem of secure outsourcing expensive computations has been well studied in the cryptography community. Chaum and Pedersen [18] first introduced the idea of ''wallets with observers'' that allows a piece of hardware installed on the client's device to carry out some computations for each transaction. Golle and Mironov [33] first introduced the concept of ringers to elegantly solve the problem of verifying computation completion for the ''inversion of one-way function'' class of outsourcing computations. Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [35] presented the first security model for outsourcing cryptographic computations, and proposed the first outsource-secure algorithm for modular exponentiations.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose a new secure outsourcing algorithm for modular exponentiations in the one-malicious version of two untrusted program model. Compared with the state-of-the-art algorithm [35] , the proposed algorithm is superior in both efficiency and checkability. Similar to [35] , we also utilize this algorithm as a subroutine to achieve outsource-secure Cramer-Shoup encryptions and Schnorr signatures. Another contribution of this paper is that we propose the first outsource-secure and efficient algorithm for simultaneous modular exponentiations, whose efficiency is (surprisingly) comparable to that of outsourcing only one modular exponentiation in [35] . As an application, we present a secure outsourcing algorithm for chameleon signatures. To demonstrate the practical performances, we provide the experimental results for the proposed outsourcing algorithms and schemes.
The main differences between this paper and and the conference version in ESORICS [25] are as follows: Firstly, we present a more clearer explanation for one-malicious version of two untrusted program model in Section 3.1. Secondly, we describe how to extend the proposed algorithm Exp to outsource-secure scalar multiplications SM on elliptic curves in the Section 3.2, Also, we presented a concrete application of the algorithm SExp, e.g., secure outsourcing algorithm for chameleon signatures in Section 5.3. Finally, we provide a thorough experimental evaluation of the proposed outsourcing algorithms and cryptographic schemes in Section 6.
Related Work
Abadi et al. [2] proved the impossibility of secure outsourcing an exponential computation while locally doing only polynomial time work. Therefore, it is meaningful only to consider outsourcing expensive polynomial time computations. The theoretical computer science community has devoted considerable attention to the problem of how to securely outsource different kinds of expensive computations. Atallah et al. [3] presented a framework for secure outsourcing of scientific computations such as matrix multiplications and quadrature. However, the solution used the disguise technique and thus allowed leakage of private information. Atallah and Li [4] investigated the problem of computing the edit distance between two sequences and presented an efficient protocol to securely outsource sequence comparisons to two servers. Recently, Blanton et al. proposed a more efficient scheme for secure outsourcing sequence comparisons [13] . Benjamin and Atallah [8] addressed the problem of secure outsourcing for widely applicable linear algebra computations. However, the proposed protocols required the expensive operations of homomorphic encryptions. Atallah and Frikken [1] further studied this problem and gave improved protocols based on the so-called weak secret hiding assumption. Recently, Wang et al. [49] presented efficient mechanisms for secure outsourcing of linear programming computations.
In the cryptographic community, there are also plenty of research work on the securely outsourcing computations. In 1992, Chaum and Pedersen [18] firstly introduced the notion of wallets with observers, a piece of secure hardware installed on the client's computer to perform some expensive computations. Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [35] proposed the first outsource-secure algorithm for modular exponentiations based on the two previous approaches of precomputation [16] , [27] , [42] , [46] and server-aided computation [10] , [31] , [41] , [51] . ChevallierMames et al. [26] presented the first algorithm for secure delegation of elliptic-curve pairings based on an untrusted server model. Besides, the outsourcer could detect any failures with probability 1 if the server misbehaves. However, an obvious disadvantage of the algorithm is that the outsourcer should carry out some other expensive operations such as scalar multiplications and exponentiations.
Since the servers (or workers) are not trusted by the outsourcers, Golle and Mironov [33] first introduced the concept of ringers to solve the trust problem of verifying computation completion. The following researchers focused on the other trust problem of retrieving payments [7] , [21] , [22] , [47] . Besides, Gennaro et al. [29] first formalized the notion of verifiable computation to solve the problem of verifiably outsourcing the computation of an arbitrary functions, which has attracted the attention of plenty of researchers [11] , [14] , [15] , [30] , [32] , [36] , [37] , [40] . Gennaro et al. [29] also proposed a protocol that allowed the outsourcer to efficiently verify the outputs of the computations with a computationally sound, non-interactive proof (instead of interactive ones). Benabbas et al. [12] presented the first practical verifiable computation scheme for high degree polynomial functions based on the approach of [29] . In 2011, Green et al. [28] proposed new methods for efficiently and securely outsourcing decryption of attributebased encryption (ABE) ciphertexts. Based on this work, Parno et al. [43] showed a construction of a multi-function verifiable computation scheme.
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Some security definitions for outsourcing computation are given in Section 2. The proposed new outsource-secure modular exponentiations algorithm and its security analysis are given in Section 3. The proposed outsource-secure CramerShoup encryptions and Schnorr signatures are given in Section 4. The secure and efficient outsourcing algorithm for simultaneous modular exponentiations is given in Section 5. The experimental evaluation of the proposed algorithms is given in Section 6. Finally, conclusions will be made in Section 7.
SECURITY DEFINITION AND MODEL
Definition of Outsource-Security
Informally, we say that T securely outsources some work to U, and ðT; UÞ is an outsource-secure implementation of a cryptographic algorithm Alg if 1) T and U implement Alg, i.e., Alg ¼ T U and 2) suppose that T is given oracle access to an adversary U 0 (instead of U) that records all of its computation over time and tries to act maliciously, U 0 cannot learn anything interesting about the input and output of T U 0 . In the following, we introduce the formal definitions for secure outsourcing of a cryptographic algorithm [35] .
Definition 1 (Algorithm with Outsource-I/O). An algorithm Alg obeys the outsource input/output specification if it takes five inputs, and produces three outputs. The first three inputs are generated by an honest party, and are classified by how much the adversary A ¼ ðE; U 0 Þ knows about them, where E is the adversarial environment that submits adversarially chosen inputs to Alg, and U 0 is the adversarial software operating in place of oracle U. The first input is called the honest, secret input, which is unknown to both E and U 0 ; the second is called the honest, protected input, which may be known by E, but is protected from U 0 ; and the third is called the honest, unprotected input, which may be known by both E and U. In addition, there are two adversarially-chosen inputs generated by the environment E: the adversarial, protected input, which is known to E, but protected from U 0 ; and the adversarial, unprotected input, which may be known by E and U. Similarly, the first output called secret is unknown to both E and U 0 ; the second is protected, which may be known to E, but not U 0 ; and the third is unprotected, which may be known by both parties of A.
The following definition of outsource-security ensures that the malicious environment E cannot gain any knowledge of the secret inputs and outputs of T U , even if T uses the malicious software U 0 written by E. 
The ideal process also proceeds in rounds. In the ideal process, we have a stateful simulator S 1 who, shielded from the secret input x i hs , but given the non-secret outputs that Alg produces when run all the inputs for round i, decides to either output the values ðy Definition 3 (-Efficient, Secure Outsourcing). A pair of algorithms ðT; UÞ is said to be an -efficient implementation of Alg if 1) T U is a correct implementation of Alg and 2) 8 inputs x, the running time of T is no more than an -multiplicative factor of the running time of Alg.
Definition 4 (-Checkable, Secure Outsourcing). A pair of algorithms ðT; UÞ is said to be a -checkable implementation of Alg if 1) T U is a correct implementation of Alg and 2) 8 inputs x, if U 0 deviates from its advertised functionality during the execution of T U 0 ðxÞ, T will detect the error with probability no less than .
Definition 5 (ð; Þ-Outsource-Security). A pair of algorithms ðT; UÞ is said to be an ð; Þ-outsource-secure implementation of Alg if it is both -efficient and -checkable. Remark 1. It is worth noting that, depending on the parameter, a secure outourcing algorithm may not provide 100 percent checkability (e.g., [35] and our algorithms). In practice, it is very likely that a client will run the outsourcing algorithm many times with the same servers. If a server cheats frequently, there is a high chance that it will be caught in some instances of the algorithm. Then, the client may seriously punish the servers when a cheating is detected. As a result, the server will not find the incentive to cheat in practice. Nevertheless, it is clear that a larger is always better. However, there is a tradeoff between the efficiency ðÞ and chackability ðÞ. For instance, a trivial way to improve the value is to add a lot of dummy computations to check whether the servers have cheated. This will significantly reduce the efficiency because the servers need to perform a lot of additional computations.
Security Model
Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [35] first presented the socalled two untrusted program model for outsourcing exponentiations modulo a prime. In this model, the adversarial environment E writes the code for two (potentially different) programs U 0 ¼ ðU
Þ. E then gives this software to T , advertising a functionality that U deviates from its advertised functionality on a non-negligible fraction of the inputs, while we cannot know which one and security means that there is a simulator S for both. This is named as the onemalicious version of two untrusted program model (i.e., ''one-malicious model'' for the simplicity), as shown in Fig. 1 .
In the real-world applications, it is equivalent to buy the two copies of the advertised software from two different vendors and achieve the security as long as one of them is honest. Recently, Canetti, Riva, and Rothblum [19] introduced the so-called refereed delegation of computation model, where the outsourcer delegates the computation to n ! 2 servers. In case the servers make contradictory claims about the computation results, the outsourcer can engage in a protocol with each of the servers, at the end of which the outsourcer can efficiently determine the true claim under the assumption that at least one of the servers is honest (while the outsourcer does not know which is honest). Obviously, one-malicious model can be viewed as a special case of refereed delegation of computation model when the number of servers n ¼ 2.
NEW AND SECURE OUTSOURCING ALGORITHM OF MODULAR EXPONENTIATIONS
In the construction from [35] (the table-lookup method) . 1 The other is to apply the well-known preprocessing techniques. By far, the most promising preprocessing algorithm is the EBPV generator [42] , which is secure against adaptive adversaries and runs in time Oðlog 2 nÞ for an n-bit exponent. On input a sufficiently large subset of truly random ðk; g k Þ pairs, EBPV generator outputs a pair ðl; g l Þ that is statistically close to the uniform distribution. Therefore, we argue that T can never control the output of the subroutine Rand, especially the value of l for both of the approaches.
Outsourcing Algorithm
We propose a new secure outsourcing algorithm Exp for exponentiation modulo a prime in the one-malicious model. In Exp, T outsources its modular exponentiation computations to U 1 and U 2 by invoking the subroutine Rand. A requirement for Exp is that the adversary A cannot know any useful information about the inputs and outputs of Exp. Similar to [35] , U i ðx; yÞ ! y x also denotes that U i takes as inputs ðx; yÞ and outputs y x mod p, where i ¼ 1, 2. Let p; q be two large primes and qjp À
Note that a may be secret or (honest/adversarial) protected and u may be (honest/adversarial) protected. Both of a and u are computationally blinded to U 1 and U 2 . The proposed algorithm Exp is given as follows:
1. To implement this functionality using U 1 and U 2 , T firstly runs Rand twice to create two blinding pairs ð; g Þ and ð; g Þ. We denote v ¼ g mod p and ¼ g mod p. 2. The main trick is a more efficient solution to logically split u and a into random looking pieces that can be computed by U 1 and U 2 . The first logical divisions are
where w ¼ u=v mod p and ¼ a À mod q. The second logical divisions are
where l ¼ a À k mod q. Remark 2. In the one-malicious model, the equation
Þ implies both U 1 and U 2 produce the correct g . Therefore, the partial computation result g also plays the role of a test query. This is slightly different from the technique in [35] while it indeed improves the efficiency and checkability of the computations.
Remark 3. The proposed algorithm Exp can also be extend to outsource-secure scalar multiplications SM on elliptic curves, i.e., aU for any a 2 Z Ã q and any U 2 G, where G is a cyclic additive point group of an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field GFðqÞ.
Trivially, the subroutine Rand is defined as RandðGÞ ! ðb; bGÞ, where b 2 Z q . T firstly runs Rand twice to create two blinding pairs ð; GÞ and ð; GÞ. The logical divisions
Next, T runs Rand to obtain three pairs ðt 1 ; t 1 GÞ, ðt 2 ; t 2 GÞ, and ðt 3 ; t 3 GÞ.
T queries U 1 in random order as
Similarly, T queries U 2 in random order as U 2 ðt 2 =t 1 ; t 1 GÞ ! t 2 G; U 2 ð=t 3 ; t 3 GÞ ! G; U 2 ðk; W Þ ! kW .
Finally, T checks that both U 1 and U 2 produce the correct outputs, i.e., t 2 G ¼ U 1 ðt 2 =t 1 ; t 1 GÞ ¼ U 2 ðt 2 =t 1 ; t 1 GÞ and U 1 ð= t 3 ; t 3 GÞ ¼ U 2 ð=t 3 ; t 3 GÞ. If not, T outputs ''error''; otherwise, T can compute aU ¼ G þ G þ kW þ lW .
Security Analysis
Theorem 3.1. In the one-malicious model, the algorithms ðT; ðU 1 ; U 2 ÞÞ are an outsource-secure implementation of Exp, 1 . In most applications, the pair cannot be reused. For example, reusing such a pair in Schnorr signature will result in the secret key exposure of the signer.
where the input ða; uÞ may be honest, secret; or honest, protected; or adversarial, protected. Proof. The proof is similar to [35] . The correctness is trivial and we only focus on security. Let A ¼ ðE; U 0 1 ; U 0 2 Þ be a PPT adversary that interacts with a PPT algorithm T in the one-malicious model. g
Firstly, we prove Pair One EVIEW real $ EVIEW ideal : If the input ða; uÞ is anything other than honest, secret, then the simulator S 1 behaves the same way as in the real execution. If ða; uÞ is an honest, secret input, then the simulator S 1 behaves as follows: On receiving the input on round i, S 1 ignores it and instead makes three random queries of the form ð j ; j Þ to both U 2 Þ is dishonest in the round i, then it will be detected by both T and S 1 with probability 2 3 , resulting in an output of ''error''; otherwise, the output of Exp is corrupted (with probability Secondly, we prove Pair Two UVIEW real $ UVIEW ideal : The simulator S 2 always behaves as follows: On receiving the input on round i, S 2 ignores it and instead makes three random queries of the form ð j ; j Þ to both U On the other hand, U 1 (resp. U 2 ) cannot distinguish the two test queries from all of the three queries that T makes. If U 1 (resp. U 2 ) fails during any execution of Exp, it will be detected with probability 
Comparison
We compare the proposed algorithm with HohenbergerLysyanskaya's algorithm in [35] . We denote by MM a modular multiplication, by MInv a modular inverse, and by Rand
Invoke an invocation of the subroutine Rand. We omit other operations such as modular additions in both algorithms. Table 1 presents the comparison of the efficiency and the checkability between Hohenberger-Lysyanskaya's algorithm and our proposed algorithm Exp.
Compared with Hohenberger-Lysyanskaya's algorithm, the proposed algorithm Exp is superior in both efficiency and checkability. More precisely, Exp requires only 7 MM, 3 MInv, 5 invocation of Rand, and 3 invocation of U 1 and U 2 for each modular exponentiation. Note that the modular exponentiation is the most basic operation in discrete-logarithm based cryptographic protocols, and millions of such computations may be outsourced to the server every day. Thus, our proposed algorithm can save huge of computational resources for both the outsourcer T and the servers U 1 and U 2 .
SECURE OUTSOURCING ALGORITHMS FOR ENCRYPTION AND SIGNATURES
In this section, we propose two secure outsourcing algorithms for Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [20] and Schnorr signature scheme [46] .
Outsource-Secure Cramer-Shoup Encryptions
The proposed outsource-secure Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme consists of the following efficient algorithms:
. System Parameters Generation: Let G be an abelian group of a large prime order q. Let g be a generator of G. Define a cryptographic secure hash function H : G 3 ! Z q . The system parameters are SP ¼ fG; q; g; Hg.
. Key Generation: On input 1 l , run the key generation algorithm to obtain the secret/public key pair ðSK; PKÞ, . Encryption: On input the public key PK and a message m 2 G, the outsourcer T runs the subroutine Rand and generates the ciphertext C as follows:
1. T runs Rand to obtain a pair ðk; r ¼ g k mod pÞ.
T firstly runs
Y Þ ! and then computes ¼ . 4. T outputs the ciphertext C ¼ ðr; s; e; Þ.
. Decryption: On input the secret key SK, and the ciphertext C ¼ðr;s; e;Þ, the outsourcer T 0 runs the subroutine Exp and computes the message m as follows: 
Remark 4.
We present a secure outsourcing algorithm for
Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme CS1b. Compared with [35] , we do not use a new subroutine Rand 0 that produces a triple ðb; g b mod p; g 0b mod pÞ, while our algorithm requires one more invocation of Exp (only) for encryption. Trivially, we could present outsoucesecure Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme CS1a (running either Rand or Rand 0 ).
Outsource-Secure Schnorr Signatures
The proposed outsource-secure Schnorr signature scheme consists of the following efficient algorithms:
. System Parameters Generation: Let p and q be two large primes that satisfy qjp À 1. Let g be an element in Z Ã p such that g q ¼ 1 mod p. Define a cryptographic secure hash function H : f0; 1g Ã ! Z p . The system parameters are SP ¼ fp; q; g; Hg.
. Key Generation: On input 1 l , run the key generation algorithm to obtain the signing/verification key pair ðx; yÞ, here y ¼ g Àx mod p. . Signature Generation: On input the singing key x and a message m, the outsourcer T runs the subroutine Rand and generates the signature as follows:
1. T runs Rand to obtain a pair ðk; r ¼ g k mod pÞ. 2. T computes e ¼ HðmjjrÞ and s ¼ k þ xe mod q. 3. T outputs the signature ¼ ðe; sÞ.
. Signature Verification: On input the verification key y, the message m, and the signature ¼ ðe; sÞ, the outsourcer T 0 runs the subroutine Exp and verifies the signature as follows: Remark 5. The proposed outsource-secure Schnorr signa< ture scheme is basically same as that in [35] . Note that the subroutine Exp is only used for the signature verification.
OUTSOURCE-SECURE ALGORITHM OF SIMULTANEOUS MODULAR EXPONENTIATIONS
In this section, we focus on simultaneous modular exponentiations u a 1 u b 2 mod p, which play an important role in many cryptographic primitives such as chameleon hashing [5] , [6] , [23] , [24] , [38] , [48] and trapdoor commitment [9] , [44] , [34] . Trivially, a simultaneous modular exponentiation can be carried out by invoking 2 modular exponentiations. This requires roughly 3n MM, where n is the bit of a and b. However, the computation cost is only 1:75n MM (i.e., roughly 1.17 modular exponentiation) if we use the simultaneous multiple exponentiation algorithm from Chapter 14 of [39] .
Outsourcing Algorithm
In the following, we propose an efficient outsource-secure algorithm of simultaneous modular exponentiations SExp in the one-malicious model. Let p; q be two large primes and qjp À 1. Given two arbitrary bases u 1 ; u 2 2 Z 
where where l ¼ a À k and s ¼ b À t.Similarly, T queries U 2 in random order as 
Efficiency
Note that SExp requires only 10 MM, 4 MInv, 5 invocation of Rand, and 4 invocation of U 1 and U 2 for each modular exponentiation. Therefore, the computation cost of SExp is much less than that of double running Exp. Surprisingly, it is even comparable to that of outsourcing one modular exponentiation [35] . Table 2 presents the comparison of the efficiency and the checkability between HohenbergerLysyanskaya's Exp algorithm and our proposed algorithm SExp.
Applications
In this section, we present a concrete application of the algorithm SExp, e.g., secure outsourcing algorithm for chameleon signatures.
Chameleon signatures, introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin [38] , are based on well established hash-and-sign paradigm, where a chameleon hash function is used to compute the cryptographic message digest. A chameleon hash function is a trapdoor one-way hash function, which prevents everyone except the holder of the trapdoor information from computing the collisions for a randomly given input. Chameleon signatures simultaneously provide the properties of non-repudiation and non-transferability for the signed message as undeniable signatures [17] do, but the former allows for simpler and more efficient realization than the latter. In particular, chameleon signatures are non-interactive and less complicated. Besides, since the chameleon signatures are based on well established hash-and-sign paradigm, it provides more generic and flexible constructions.
In order to illustrate in details, we take a concrete chameleon signature scheme as an example, which employed for the Schnorr signature and the chameleon hashing based on the Pedersen trapdoor commitment [9] , [44] .
. System Parameters Generation: Let p and q be two large primes that satisfy qjp À 1. . Signature Generation: On input the singing key x A and a message m, the outsourcer T generates the chameleon signature as follows:
1. T randomly chooses an integer a 2 R Z Ã q , and runs SExp to obtain SExpða; m; g; y B Þ ! . 2. T runs Rand to obtain a pair ðk; r ¼ g k mod pÞ. 3. T computes e ¼ Hð jjrÞ and s ¼ k þ x A e mod q. 4. T outputs the signature ¼ ða; e; sÞ.
. Signature Verification: On input the verification key y A and the hash key y B , the message m, and the signature ¼ ða; e; sÞ, the outsourcer T 0 can verify the chameleon signature as follows: 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we provide an experimental evaluation of the proposed outsourcing algorithms and cryptographic schemes. Our experiment is simulated on two LINUX machines with Intel Core 4 processors running at 3.20 GHz and 4G memory (cloud server), and AMD Core 1 processor running at 1.60 GHz and 512 M memory (local user), respectively. The programming language is Python. The parameters of p and q are same to Federal Information Processing Standards for DSA (FIPS-186-2). That is, p is a 512-bit prime and qjp À 1 is a 160-bit prime p ¼ 8df2a494 492276aa 3d25759b b06869cb eac0d83a fb8d0cf7 cbb8324f 0d7882e5 d0762fc5 b7210eaf c2e9adac 32ab7aac 49693dfb f83724c2 ec0736ee 31c80291 q ¼ c773218c 737ec8ee 993b4f2d ed30f48e dace915f:
Firstly, we provide a simulation for both single and simultaneous modular exponentiations (i.e., Exp and SExp) as shown in Figs. 2 and 3 , respectively. Note that a number of random pairs with the form of ðb; g b mod pÞ should be prepared off-line, and we omit this in our simulation. Due to our outsourcing technique, a number of computations have been delegated to both U 1 and U 2 and thus the time cost for T is much smaller than that for directly computing modular exponentiation from scratch.
Next, we provide the evaluation time for the outsourcing algorithms proposed in [35] and this paper. From the result shown in Table 3 , we can see that the outsource-secure single exponentiation algorithm Exp proposed in this paper is superior to Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya's algorithm [35] in efficiency. Moreover, the efficiency of the outsource-secure algorithm for simultaneous exponentiations SExp is comparable to that of outsourcing only one modular exponentiation in [35] .
In addition, we present the evaluation time for outsourcing Cramer-Shoup encryptions, Schnorr signatures and chameleon signatures in Table 4 . Obviously, compared with the original schemes, the time cost for T in outsourcing schemes is mostly reduced due to the algorithms Exp and SExp.
Remark 6. For all outsourcing algorithms, there is only one-round communication between the client and the servers (i.e. the client gives the server inputs, and the server returns results). For each instance of an outsourcing algorithm, the communication complexity is only a few kilobytes so that it will not downgrade the overall performance. Nevertheless, we leave it as a future work to have a more detailed study.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose two outsource-secure and efficient algorithms for modular exponentiations and simultaneous modular exponentiations, which are the most basic and expensive operations in many discrete-logarithm cryptosystems. Compared with the algorithm [35] , the proposed algorithm is superior in both efficiency and checkability.
The security model of our outsourcing algorithms requires the outsourcer to interact with two non-colluding cloud servers (the same as [35] ). Therefore, an interesting open problem is whether there is an efficient algorithm for secure outsourcing modular exponentiation using only one untrusted cloud sever. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
